Unlike pricing, pricing is a kind of informal collusion that is generally legal. The price leader, sometimes referred to as the „parallel price,“ occurs when the dominant competitor publishes its price in front of other companies in the market and other companies match the advertised price. The market leader will generally set the price to maximize profits, which may not be the price that maximized the profits of other companies. The Cournot model, where companies compete for production, and the Bertrand model, where companies compete for price, describe the dynamics of the duopoly. In such a scenario, there are a number of plausible reactions and results. If Coca-Cola lowers their prices, Pepsi can follow up to make sure they don`t lose market share. In this situation, the exodus leads to defeat. In other words, due to the initial price decline due to Coca-Cola (betraying the status quo), both companies are likely to see lower profit margins. On the other hand, despite the Coca-Cola gap, Pepsi managed to maintain the price point by sacrificing market share to Coca-Cola, while maintaining the established price point. Detention dilemma scenarios are difficult strategic choices, as any deviation from established competitive practice may result in a decrease in gains and/or market share. Several factors are deterresing. First, pricing in the United States is illegal and there are antitrust laws to prevent business-to-business agreements. Secondly, coordination between companies is difficult and the number of companies involved is all the more important.

Third, there is a risk of overtaking. A company may agree to meet and then break the agreement, undermining the profits of the companies that still maintain the agreement. Finally, a company may be deterred from collusion if it is not able to effectively sanction companies that could break the agreement. During the COVID 19 pandemic, companies such as Pfizer and Moderna announced rates for their coronavirus vaccines, which would be different due to agreements with different governments. In the United States, executive orders have been adopted to reduce the cost of prescription drugs, which Pfizer`s CEO called „enormous destruction“ to the pharmaceutical industry. [35] Gambling theory suggests that cartels are inherently unstable because the behaviour of cartel members is a prisoner`s dilemma. Any cartel member would be able to make a higher profit, at least in the short term, by breaking the agreement (a larger quantity produced or sold at a lower price) than it would under the agreement. However, if the deal collapses because of resignations, companies will return to competition, profits would go down and things would be worse. While game theory is important for understanding firm behaviours in oligopolies, it is generally not necessary to understand competitive or monopolized markets. In competitive markets, companies have such a small individual impact that taking other companies into account is simply not necessary.

A monopolized market has only one company, so there are no strategic interactions. International airfares have set their prices in accordance with IATA, a practice for which there is a specific exception for cartels and abuse of dominant position. [21] [best source required] In October 2005, The Korean company Samsung pleaded guilty to conspiring with other companies, including Infineon and Hynix Semiconductor, to set the price of DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) chips. Samsung was the third company to be indicted under the international cartel and fined US$300 million, the second-largest fine in U.S. history.